As of August 1st 2015 this site will no longer being updated, therefore any rights based information can no longer be relied upon. However, as most of the website is based upon and refers to Freedom of information Act (FOIA) responses, [DWP provider guidance and contracts] anyone can make new similar FOIA requests via https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/body/dwp to cross check the validity of the information on http://www.refuted.org.uk that relies upon FOIA disclosures.
Can DWP providers force you to use Universal Jobmatch clones like myworksearch.co.uk and www.avantajobs.com?
Universal Jobmatch (UJ) and consent
It is self-evident that Universal Jobmatch (UJ) can be and is used to facilitate benefit sanctions and total loss of benefits. This as such is the principle reason the Information Commissioners Office requires that the DWP must obtain users permission (consent)
to access their UJ account.
Clones of UJ
Even so, compulsory DWP Work Programme (WP) and Community Workfare Placement (CWP) workfare providers have created clones of UJ, to undertake supervised Jobsearch.
Against this background, suppliers of these clones and DWP providers have a vested interest not to explicitly inform WP and CWP conscripted participants, that like UJ, it seems apparent that use and therefore registration with these clones is voluntary. This can be said to be particularly true as these clones are set up so that DWP provider and hence DWP access to user accounts personal data is switched on by default, without any user option or inbuilt safeguard to stop this access in any way.
With this level of default access the DWP and DWP providers are free to use the personal data within these clones to arrange benefit sanctions that can last up to 3 years, as well as completely end entitlement to benefits like Jobseeker’s Allowance.
Examples of Jobmatch clones
MyWorkSearch
“You can also log in and check the extent to which any individual has or has not been learning how to look for work and actively job-searching. You can interact with jobseekers, monitoring tasks as well as suggesting jobs and activities and providing assistance. Most importantly, using the MyWorkSearch data, you can focus your help where it is really needed.” [all of which can be used to facilitate benefit sanctions]
http://www.myworksearch.co.uk/housing-associations/
http://www.avantajobs.com
“Work Programme participants are not mandated to use http://www.avantajobs.com and can therefore choose not to use this site…. If a participant wishes to stop using the website they can do so….where personal data is loaded onto http://www.avantajobs.com DWP remains the data controller…” [owner]
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/181920/response/443194/attach/html/3/5028%20Response.pdf.html
From: DWP Central FoI Team – 24 October 2011
http://refuted.org.uk/2013/10/22/avantajobs/
Tips
If asked to register and use, by DWP providers, websites like http://www.avantajobs.com and MyWorkSearch, ask for the request to be put in writing and tell them to also say in writing what would happen if you did not register or use them and do ask them to write who would have access to the personal data uploaded or created within any account, explicitly asking them to say in any written response whether the DWP and DWP providers would have access.
Resources
- Jobsearch evidence: a definitive guide
- Universal Jobmatch: Your key rights
- Universal Jobmatch: Why does DWP need your permission (consent) to access your account?
- Universal Jobmatch: How to handle questions about giving Jobcentre/DWP no access to your account
- Extensive Tips on JSA and ESA sanction appeals and claiming Hardship Payments
Universal Jobmatch: Why does DWP need your permission (consent) to access your account?
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) says the reason why the DWP needs user permission to access their Universal Jobmatch (UJ) account is because it could be used to have an adverse* and unfair effect on their benefit claims, through benefit sanctions and or loss of entitlement.
“While the DWP is already the data controller for the information, it would be considered ‘unfair’ for the UJM information to be used to consider the customer’s JSA (or similar benefit) claim without the prior permission of the customer being obtained by the DWP” [emphasis added]
ICO 15 May 2015
*Principle 1 of the Data Protection Act requires the DWP, it’s contractors and sub-contractors to process personal data fairly and lawfully and “not use the data in ways that have unjustified adverse effects on the individuals concerned“.
Resources
Universal Jobmatch and your ‘public CV’: what can an employer see?
Further to a discussion on twitter, the DWP has released information about what an employer can see when they conduct a jobseeker search of ‘public CVs’ on Universal Jobmatch (UJ). The DWP say that employers with Jobmatch accounts cannot see any personal data when they conduct Jobseeker searchs and the full content of a CV is only available to an employer when the Jobseeker applies for a job through UJ, either by sending their CV direct to the employer or through UJ.
“…when an employer conducts a jobseeker search on Universal Jobmatch the search function does not search jobseekers CV’s but instead matches jobseekers to vacancy criteria that an employer has placed on Universal Jobmatch. The match is based on information that a jobseeker has recorded within their profile on Universal Jobmatch system, for example, skills, location etc”
DWP Central FoI Team – 03/06/2015
Confusion has been caused by the DWP’s use of the term “public CV”, which understandably leads people to believe that employers, if not the public, would have easy access to the full content of a CV.
It seems highly probable that the DWP’s original plan was that UJ users CVs would have had more open access, alongside DWP staff having access to users account. However, as the processing of personal data on UJ can lead directly to benefit sanctions, this came into conflict with Principle 1 of the Data Protection Act, part of which requires that personal data is not processed “in ways that have unjustified adverse effects on the individuals concerned“. Consequently DWP access to a UJ users account needs permission (consent) and use of the term “public CV” is misleading and inappropriate.
This need to ensure personal data is processed fairly and lawfully, under Principle 1, may go some way to explain why DWP compulsory back to work scheme providers do not appear to mandate participants to use UJ privacy invasive benefit sanction clones like myworksearch.co.uk and avantajobs.com.
Resources:
Welfare Rights Action Gathering: Sat 30th May, London
Boycott Workfare is running a Welfare Action Gathering on Saturday May 30th in London.
To support this a 1 page leaflet has been created covering:
- Taking support to Jobcentres
- Universal Jobmatch
- Jobsearch records
- Do Not Sign
- Welfare rights information and resources.
#FOI Watch: 243 pages of 11393 Jobbridge #workfare exploiters named and shamed in Ireland
Whilst the UK’s DWP, has for years, refused to disclose the names of #workfare exploiters, 243 pages of 11393 workfare exploiters has just been published in Ireland.
The #WorkMustPay Campaign is made up of a small network of young activists who take part in a series of actions to directly challenge the acceptability of employers taking on unpaid JobBridge interns instead of providing even the basic respect of a minimum wage for workers.
UK: Name & Shame #workfare exploiters
DWP loses another 3 FOI tribunal hearings, must release names of workfare exploiters
DWP Digital Tools of Oppression: for unemployed and people in-work to be exploited by employers
Following on from The Universal Credit (Work-Related Requirements) In Work Pilot Scheme and Amendment Regulations 2015 and the explanatory note that highlighted IT ideas to match workers with employers to fill flexible short hours. Today the DWP disclosed fuller details of the ideas submitted by Accenture and others, to make the unemployed and people in-work more insure and open to employer exploitation. An extract of ideas are below, these suggestions are mostly based upon extending Universal Jobmatch so it gives employers and the DWP greater control over peoples lives, forcing people under Universal Credit to make known the “Slivers of Time” they are free to be exploited by employers or face benefit sanctions.
“Job Scheduling – posting one’s availability through UC Jobmatch for specific dates or
hours within a day…
…people interested in elderly care we could present the necessary skills for entry level, but also those which will be required to increase earnings….
Slivers of Time…
…what ideas are implemented as part of these trials, whether it be from a small scale nudge [psychological coercion] intervention or a wider scale One Digital Service portal or app…”
IDS’s Centre for Social (in)Justice also has a few words
“Universal Jobmatch is an important innovation but in reality, the department has
only just begun to scratch the surface of the potential of this tool.
Universal Jobmatch software should be updated to include a timetable where claimants can list the hours that they would be available….
…filter part-time jobs that are appropriate based on what a claimant has already identified through their own work-readiness timetable. ”
Deloitte on your CV
(suggesting people should add more personal data to their CV)
“a programme of work to enhance the ontology by factoring in skills associated with non-work and voluntary activities, such as, sports coaching, youth work, mentoring, home visiting, and the like would enrich the skills base elicited from a CV ”
#UniversalCredit: Activities that could b imposed when in employment, including Psychological Fundamentalism “Proposals submitted included a sponsored website that provides details of claimants as a pool of local top up workers available to employers. Named individuals could be booked instantly, possibly at short notice and for short periods. This would fit around claimant’s availability and existing work and child care commitments. Each claimant would be given a personal online diary in which they enter hours for today, the day after or weeks ahead. They would also define the terms on which they will accept bookings.” http://refuted.org.uk/2014/12/05/in-work-activities/
Jobcentre ‘Work Coaches’ cannot make following mandatory
Today the DWP disclosed a summary of it’s Work Coaches (WC) “main activities“, it is worth noting that use of the ‘My Work Plan‘ is entirely voluntary and benefit claimants can restrict WC/DWP access to Universal Jobmatch accounts. Under Universal Credit (UC), it is not a requirement to sign a Claimant Commitment (CC), legislation requires that one be “accepted” via a number of means. Before accepting a UC CC, there is a 7 day cooling off period.
Work Coaches mail activities
“However, as they would be considered Work Coaches, the main activities
associated with this role are:
– To make every claimant contact count by coaching them to take
responsibility for getting themselves into work. Complete a Claimant
Commitment and be accountable for the decisions made during
interviews with claimants to help move them back into sustained
employment.
– Agree the Claimant Commitment, obtain a signed copy from claimant
and give the claimant a hard copy. Record on LMS that the Claimant
Commitment has been accepted/disputed and verified before sending
the claim pack to the Service Centre.
– Provide an immediate second opinion on colleagues’ refuse to sign
cases (Claimant Commitment)
– Promote and encourage the use of Universal Jobmatch (UJ) for
jobsearch activity. Proactively suggest ways claimants may improve
the matches they receive, encouraging claimants to create an account
and explain the benefits of allowing DWP access to their account
– Offer dynamic, flexible advice and support to underpin claimants’
personalised commitment of job search actions, and support them to
develop the skills they need to look for and obtain work.
– To promote the use of the My Work Plan by coaching claimants to
forward plan their own work search activities that will allow them the
opportunity to document their plans and achievements towards finding
employment.
– Support staff in implementing conditionality and ensuring they
understand the level of evidence required in the My Work Plan.
– To be accountable for decisions on availability with a clear rationale for
the level, frequency and intensity of contact they have with each
claimant.
– Undertake Work Services activity with the claimant, including
maintenance of claimant’s skills/CV using Universal Jobmatch where
appropriate
– Reconsider mandation decisions (Jobseeker’s Directions) where
requested by claimant. ” [emphasis added] https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/specialist_advisors_at_jobcentre#incoming-640421
Just to let all know @refuted will be moving on from August and refuted.org.uk will be converted into an archive
It’s a farewell to alms
http://refuted.org.uk/rights/farewell/
MPs Benefits Sanctions report published: “broad” independent inquiry recommended
Full report: Benefit sanctions policy beyond the Oakley Review
Download (pdf) – view online (web page) online.(pdf)
Summary: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmworpen/814/81403.htm
Source: Inquiry: Benefit sanctions policy beyond the Oakley Review – Evidence: Oral & Written
Response: Work and Pensions Committee’s report on sanctions: A whitewash! –
Report: Conclusions and recommendations
In this list, conclusions are set out in plain type and recommendations, to which the
Government is required to respond, are set out in italic type.
[To see italic type, please download (pdf) or view online.]
Call for an independent review
1. We recommend that DWP commission a broad independent review of benefit conditionality and sanctions, to investigate whether sanctions are being applied appropriately, fairly and proportionately, in accordance with the relevant Regulations and guidance, across the Jobcentre Plus network. This review should be established and report as soon as is practicable in the next Parliament. (Paragraph 9)
Information and communications
2. We welcome DWP’s acceptance of the Oakley Review’s findings, and the steps that it has taken towards implementation of the Review’s recommendations. In particular, we welcome changes made to improve the clarity of letters to claimants and to provide clearer information on the benefit sanctions system to claimants of all out- of-work benefits. We believe that a continued focus on the clarity of sanctions- related communications and information will go some way towards improving claimants’ understanding of their obligations and the sanctioning process. But we recognise that communication and information is only one aspect of the sanctions regime that needs to be addressed, and does not address concerns about sanctions implementation and a target-driven culture. (Paragraph 22)
Providers’ ability to accept “good reason”
3. We accept that allowing contracted Work Programme providers formally to accept “good reason” for a claimant not fulfilling a benefit condition will require both legislative change and contractual negotiations. However, we believe that DWP should take more urgent steps to ensure that a more common-sense approach is set out in guidance. We recommend that DWP’s guidance to contracted providers makes clear that discretion can be applied where providers’ staff are confident that a claimant’s failure to meet a mandatory condition was due to extenuating circumstances beyond the claimant’s control. We further recommend that negotiations with Work Programme prime providers, ahead of the re-letting of prime contracts in 2017, prioritise the development of a more flexible approach to “mandation”. (Paragraph 29)
Pre-sanction written warnings and non-financial sanctions
4. We note that the Department considers that piloting of pre-sanction written warnings and non-financial sanctions for first-time Work Programme failures where the claimant has a previously good record of compliance with benefit conditionality would require legislative change. We believe that there would be considerable value in piloting these approaches urgently; we therefore urge DWP either to reconsider its position, and conduct small scale pilots prior to making legislative changes, or to bring forward the
necessary secondary legislation, and conduct the pilots, as soon as is practicable in the next Parliament. We also recommend that DWP pilot pre-sanction written warnings and non-financial sanctions in relation to claimants’ first-time failures within the Jobcentre Plus conditionality system. (Paragraph 33)
Impact of sanctions on Housing Benefit
5. We recommend that DWP clarify, in its response to this Report: the extent to which Housing Benefit payments have been incorrectly impacted by Jobseekers Allowance sanctions, as identified by the Oakley Review; the steps it has taken—beyond advising claimants themselves to inform their local authority when they are sanctioned—to address the issue; and whether robust systems are now in place to ensure that the issue no longer arises. (Paragraph 38)
Helping claimants to comply
6. We agree that benefit conditionality is appropriate and necessary but reiterate our view that it is important that conditionality is balanced by effective employment advice and support for claimants. We recommend that DWP ensure that the relevant guidance to JCP Work Coaches includes that sanctioned claimants should be offered additional, tailored support, to help them meet their benefit conditions and improve their employment prospects, including attending a specific meeting after a sanction has been applied to discuss how to improve compliance and ensure that the Claimant Commitment fairly reflects the individual’s needs and abilities. (Paragraph 51)
In-work conditionality
7. We recommend that the Government does not proceed with in-work sanctions beyond the existing pilots until robust evidence is available from the pilots to demonstrate that in-work conditionality can be effectively applied. (Paragraph 56)
Evaluating the Welfare Reform Act 2012 changes
8. There is evidence that active and conditional unemployment benefit regimes, in which financial sanctions play a part, are relatively effective, but there is very limited evidence, from the UK or overseas, on the relative impacts of the three parts of the overall approach: the benefit conditions themselves; the accompanying employment support; and the application, or deterrent threat, of financial sanctions. We accept that any sanctions regime must be “credible” if it is to influence claimant behaviour; however, it is not possible from the available evidence to come to a view on the relative efficacy and impacts of longer minimum sanction periods compared to shorter ones. We believe that it is important that the Government conduct evaluations to enhance the evidence base in this policy area, to demonstrate that the use of sanctions is not purely punitive. (Paragraph 59)
9. We recommend that DWP evaluate, by testing different approaches, the relative impacts on movements off out-of-work benefits and into work of: benefit conditions themselves; the level of accompanying employment support; and the application, or deterrent threat, of financial sanctions. We further recommend that DWP evaluate the
efficacy and impacts of four-week minimum sanction periods, as introduced following the Welfare Reform Act 2012, compared to minimum sanction periods of one week. (Paragraph 60)
Monitoring the destinations of sanctioned claimants
10. Recently published research emphasises the importance of developing more effective systems for monitoring the destinations of claimants leaving benefit in general and, in particular, the destinations of claimants leaving benefit following a sanction. The introduction of Universal Credit affords the Department considerable opportunities to develop new and more effective systems. We recommend that DWP develop systems, using RTI data, to track shorter and longer term employment outcomes and earnings progress for sanctioned benefit claimants within Universal Credit, as part of its ongoing evaluation of the efficacy and impacts of benefit sanctions policy. (Paragraph 66)
Setting appropriate JSA job-searching conditions
11. We recommend that DWP’s evaluation of the Claimant Commitment includes an assessment of: whether claimants are fully involved in the process of developing a suitable job-searching strategy and in setting realistic and achievable targets; and whether reasonable conditions are being set for all groups of JSA claimants, including those with physical and mental health conditions, learning disabilities and caring responsibilities. We also believe that more than another year before the findings of this evaluation are published is too long a wait for an assessment of new benefit conditions affecting so many claimants. We therefore further recommend that DWP expedite its evaluation and publish initial findings as early as possible in the next Parliament, and certainly before the end of 2015. We believe that there is a specific need to review whether the conditionality applied to those claiming JSA while a decision on ESA eligibility is being reconsidered or appealed should be altered to reflect this, and the individual’s specific circumstances. (Paragraph 74)
12. DWP’s new Vulnerability Guidance is a welcome step forward in trying to more routinely identify claimants who are vulnerable and require support to “enable them to access DWP benefits and services”. However, we are concerned that, while the guidance we have seen is a good, general purpose document, which includes helpful definitions of what might constitute vulnerability, it does not give clear guidance on the level of support vulnerable groups would need in order to fulfil their benefit conditionality. There remains a danger that some vulnerable individuals are being “set up to fail”. (Paragraph 79)
13. We recommend that DWP, drawing on specialist advice from health experts, develop guidance on vulnerability which is specifically intended to assist JCP staff in identifying vulnerable JSA claimants, including those with mental health problems and learning disabilities, who may face difficulties in understanding and/or complying with benefit conditionality. This guidance should include examples or case studies to illustrate how conditionality can be tailored in a range of circumstances. We further recommend that the Department amalgamate this guidance into the broader Claimant Commitment
guidance, so that it becomes part of the routine process of developing appropriate and tailored JSA conditionality. (Paragraph 80)
Use of Jobseeker Directions
14. We note the concern expressed by some witnesses that use of Jobseeker Directions has increased in some JCP offices in recent years. While we appreciate that there may be circumstances in which it might be appropriate for JCP staff to mandate a JSA claimant to undertake a very specific type of work-related activity, such as particular skills training, it is not immediately clear why such activities could not invariably be included in Claimant Commitments. Intuitively we would expect there to be minimal, if any, use made of Jobseeker Directions, as the Claimant Commitment becomes more firmly established. We recommend that DWP’s evaluation of the Claimant Commitment include an assessment of the appropriate use of Jobseeker Directions and their interaction with the Claimant Commitment process. (Paragraph 84)
Single parent conditionality
15. There is evidence that single parent JSA claimants are more likely to receive a non- adverse JSA sanction decision than the general JSA claimant population. Whilst not necessarily causing individual financial hardship, it should be recognised that the raising of a “doubt” in itself can cause distress. Notwithstanding the fact that many do successfully offer “good reason”, there may still be some claimants who experience an adverse decision if they are not enabled and encouraged to offer “good reason”. We also note concern from those representing single parents that claimants and JCP Work Coaches may be insufficiently aware of the statutory flexibilities designed to protect single parents from inappropriate conditionality, and that this may be leading to unnecessary sanction referrals which are subsequently overturned by Decision Makers. (Paragraph 87)
16. We recommend that DWP increase training for JCP Work Coaches on the regulatory flexibilities which should be applied to the benefit conditions of single parent JSA claimants. We also recommend that DWP produce a straightforward, plain English guide to the flexibilities, which should be given to all single parent JSA claimants. We further recommend that DWP review the regulatory flexibilities afforded to single parent Universal Credit claimants, with a view to ensuring that they are offered the same level of protection from inappropriate conditionality and sanctioning as JSA claimants. (Paragraph 88)
Testing a more targeted approach to conditionality and sanctioning
17. Employment services professionals believe that strict conditionality, backed up by financial sanctions, is necessary in only a small minority of circumstances, in particular where claimants have a history of poor engagement with employment support, and where their lack of engagement is “motivational or attitudinal”. If the intention of sanctioning is to change behaviour, we believe that it is important to identify and focus on those claimants whose attitudes towards job-seeking and work the Department seeks to change. We believe that an effective targeted approach to strict
conditionality, which focuses on this group of claimants, would have the benefit of protecting more determined jobseekers, and the vulnerable, from inappropriate, and potentially counter-productive, sanctions. We recommend that DWP draw on its 2011 research into the attitudes of unemployed people towards job-seeking and work, and consider whether its insights could inform a more targeted approach to benefit conditionality and sanctioning. We recommend that DWP establish a small-scale pilot to test the efficacy of a targeted approach based on segmentation of claimants by their attitudes and motivations. (Paragraph 93)
Categories of JSA “sanction”
18. We recommend that DWP make a clear distinction—in its processes, its communications with claimants, and in the official data—between claimants who are not meeting the underlying conditions of entitlement, in particular those who are genuinely “not actively seeking employment” and may therefore be abusing the system, and those who have not fully complied with the precise terms of a Claimant Commitment. At the moment, both receive the same penalty. (Paragraph 101)
19. We recommend that the Government confirm the steps it has taken to ensure that suspensions of JSA payments where the JCP Work Coach believes that the claimant has not been “actively seeking employment” do not occur before good reason can be considered, and a decision made, by a Decision Maker detached from the employment support process. DWP should set out the steps it has taken to address this issue, to provide assurance that the newly instituted procedure of making decisions in these circumstances within two days of referral is sufficiently robust to ensure that the decision has in fact been made, and the claimant notified, before the JSA payment is suspended. We also believe that notification should be by either written or telephone communication, depending on the claimant’s preferences as previously expressed to JCP staff when signing the Claimant Commitment, or subsequent to this. (Paragraph 108)
Review of the legislative framework for sanctioning
20. Given the complexity of the existing legislation, there is a strong case for a review of the underpinning legislative framework for conditionality and sanctions, to ensure that the basis for sanctioning is clearly defined, and safeguards to protect vulnerable groups clearly set out. We recommend that the clarity and coherence of the legislative framework for benefit sanctions policy be included in the terms of reference of the full independent review which we have recommended. (Paragraph 112)
ESA sanctioning
21. The very large majority of ESA sanctions relate to claimants’ failures to attend or participate in the Work Programme. This reason accounts for almost all of the notable increase in ESA sanctioning which has occurred since 2013. While the performance of the Work Programme has improved significantly after a poor start, and is now meeting minimum contractual performance expectations for new ESA claimants, there remains
widespread concern, including from contracted providers, that the Work Programme does not yet provide sufficiently specialised and effective support for ESA claimants who are some distance from the labour market. We therefore believe there is a risk that ESA conditionality is still not properly balanced by effective employment support. We recommend that DWP review ESA sanctioning in relation to the Work Programme, accelerating development of more effective support for this group, and prioritising the updating of regulations early in the next Parliament, to empower Work Programme providers to be able to accept “good cause”. We call upon DWP also to review the programme of Core Visits as soon as possible, to clarify what changes to conditionality and the application of sanctions occur as a consequence of such Core Visits. (Paragraph 134)
22. There is a lack of evidence for the efficacy of financial sanctions in moving claimants with long-term health conditions and disabilities closer to employment or into work. There is some evidence that voluntary approaches are more appropriate and effective. We welcome DWP’s commitment to testing alternative approaches, particularly for ESA claimants with mental health conditions. We recommend that the Department include voluntary approaches in its pilots, including the Individual Placement with Support model. DWP should test and evaluate these new approaches, and publish its findings, prior to the re-letting of Work Programme contracts in 2017. DWP should also test alternative, non-financial models of conditionality for vulnerable groups. In particular, it should review the situation of claimants with co-morbidities, to ensure that there are no perverse unintended consequences in applying non-financial models to particular vulnerable groups of claimants. (Paragraph 135)
Further improving communication with claimants
23. We note with concern claimants’ uncertainty over whether a sanction has been applied which, as the Oakley Review highlighted, has arisen in large part because of poor communication from DWP. Such confusion can often feed through to self-reported statistics about the role benefit sanctions may play in the requirement for emergency food aid, potentially leading to false conclusions being drawn. We recommend that DWP carry out further work with the Behavioural Insights Unit to ensure that claimants understand their position within the benefits system, their underlying entitlements and, when changes to their benefit payments occur, what the reasons are for this. (Paragraph 141)
Hardship payments
24. The improvements DWP has made to its systems and communications should ensure that all claimants are aware of the potential availability of hardship payments, and have sped up the hardship payment application and decision-making process. Despite this some people who would qualify are still not applying for a variety of reasons. Furthermore, there is widespread concern that DWP’s system of discretionary hardship payments does not prevent severe financial hardship in all cases, often because JSA hardship payments are not typically available until the 15th day of a sanction period. We believe that changes to the system are required to
ensure that the risks of severe financial hardship are more comprehensively mitigated. There should also be signposting for, and access to, welfare advice support. (Paragraph 149)
25. We recommend that DWP make hardship payments available from day one of a sanction period in all cases, including JSA. We further recommend that, where the claimant has dependent children or is a member of a vulnerable group, the hardship payment decision-making process be instigated by DWP Decision Makers, and coordinated with the decision on the sanction referral itself, regardless of whether the claimant has proactively applied for a hardship payment. The fact that in January
2015 the most recent data on hardship payments were from 2010–11, and those data were only made available in response to a Parliamentary Question, is highly regrettable, particularly given that this has been a period of significant change in the sanctions regime. It should not take four years to gather and validate such data. We therefore also recommend that DWP publish, on at least an annual basis, official data on the number of applications for hardship payments made by sanctioned claimants; the number of hardship payments made; and the number which were made on day one of a sanction period. (Paragraph 150)
Investigating deaths of benefit claimants
26. It is right that the Department investigates all deaths of claimants resulting from suicide, and other deaths of vulnerable claimants with complex needs, through a system of “peer reviews”. We fully appreciate that in such cases there are likely to be multiple and complex factors involved. We understand that DWP has undertaken 49 peer reviews since February 2012, and that in 33 cases these resulted in recommendations for consideration at either national or local level. We ask that the Department set out the number of peer review cases where the claimant was subject to a benefit sanction at the time of death and the results of any such reviews in terms of policy changes. In addition, DWP should seek to establish a body modelled on the Independent Police Complaints Commission, to conduct reviews, at the request of relatives, or automatically where no living relative remains, in all instances where an individual on an out-of-work working-age benefit dies whilst in receipt of that benefit. Such a model, operated within the purview of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, should ensure that the role of all publicly-funded agencies involved in the provision of services or benefits to the individual is scrutinised, so that a learning document can be produced setting out how policy, and the service delivery pathway, can be improved at every stage. (Paragraph 154)
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